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Abstract 
 
I introduce the concept of the reputational budget, to consider its possible uses within a 
Reputation-based Governance (Rebag) framework. The concept is illustrated using an 
application to the management of public works, where firms help public administrations 
in building public infrastructure. 
The reputational budget has several interesting applications. In particular, it 
provides objective criteria to use reputational information in public procurement, and it 
may alleviate the moral hazard problem that arises in the life-cycle of bureaucrats. 
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“Сегодня мы работаем на репутацию.  
Завтра репутация будет работать на нас” 
Russian saying1. 
1. Introduction 
 
Reputational considerations play an obvious role in public choice. Electors are 
influenced by the reputation of candidates, and the choice of political appointees to 
some extent depends on their past record. Deals and alliances are made, or not made, 
according to convenience and also to the perceived trustfulness of one’s partner. The 
importance of reputation encompasses both the public and the private sphere. “Word of 
mouth” plays a key role in determining societal outcomes, ranging from serious matters, 
to very mundane problems, such as the choice of the restaurant where to dine2. 
Recently, the diffusion of appropriate Internet-based information systems has 
allowed for a more formal management of reputational considerations within decision-
making processes. An example is provided by the eBay auction site, where buyers and 
sellers can cast a vote on the quality of their relation with their business partner. Such 
assessments remain visible and constitute the basis for the computation of what amounts 
to an index of reputation. In this context, the Internet allows for a “digitalization of 
word-of-mouth” (Dellarocas, 2003). 
In Picci (2007a, 2007b) I propose a comprehensive framework to address 
governance issues, that I call Reputation-based Governance. Such framework employs a 
dedicated Internet-based information system containing a set of very detailed 
                                                 
1  Translation: “Today we work for our reputation. Tomorrow our reputation will work for 
us.” 
2  The concept of reputation (and of trust) can be considered using two alternative sets of 
game theoretic tools. Reputation can be seen in a moral hazard setting using the Folk Theorem: 
in an infinitely repeated game, players may prefer the long-run benefit of not cheating, to the 
short-run advantage of cheating. Also, reputation can be considered in an adverse selection 
setting, for example within a bayesian game context, where the quality of a player is not 
immediately evident to others. See Cabral, 2005, for details and for a formal definition of 
concepts. 
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information on policies and, most importantly, where all the interested parties may post 
their assessments of the outcomes of those policies. The assessments reverberate to the 
actors of governance and allow for the computation of an index of their reputation. Such 
reputations, in turn, provide both ex-post and ex-ante desirable incentives to the relevant 
actors.  
In Picci (2007a) I consider an application of Reputation-based Governance to the 
management of public works. Reputation-based governance of public works is based on 
the availability of a suitable information system where all projects to build public 
infrastructures are described. Upon completion of each project, the relevant public 
administration assesses the quality of the work carried out by the contracting firms. 
These, in turn, are allowed to rate how the public administration has managed the 
project.  
A key element of reputation-based governance of public works is the fact that 
the citizens who are affected by a given project are allowed to assess the information 
system, in order to declare what they think about its outcome. Assessments are 
quantitative, while there may be a possibility of also leaving comments expressed in 
natural language. All the quantitative assessments received by one project, appropriately 
weighted and aggregated, form an overall index of its perceived quality. These 
information then propagate to the firms and to the administrations that contributed to the 
execution of the projects, and allow for the computation of their reputations. The 
reputation of an actor of governance, in the end, is a function of the perceived outcomes 
of the projects carried out by that actor over time. 
In this paper I consider again the application of reputation-based governance to 
the management of public works, so as to provide a concrete setting to illustrate a new 
concept, that I call the “reputational budget”. The reputational budget is a number 
expressing “how much reputation” an actor of governance has accumulated. It is 
different from reputation proper, because, unlike it, the reputational budget is also a 
function of the size of the projects. The differences between reputation proper, and the 
reputational budget, have implications that are important enough to justify the 
introduction of a new concept.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I illustrate a simple example 
of computation of the reputational budget. Then, I suggest how the reputational budget 
could be used. The conclusions follow. 
 
2. The Reputational budget 
 
Consider a public administration executing a number of public works, each one 
with the help of a single contracting firm. Table 1 shows the example that will lead us 
through the illustration of the reputational budget. For simplicity, assume that the works 
have been executed only in two years, 2007 (“this year”) and 2006 (“last year”). 
Assume further that there are a total of 9 firms, identified in Column 1 of Table 1, and 
that each one of them has contracted two projects, of varying dimensions, one in each 
year.  
To simplify matters, we assume that upon completion of a project, only the 
citizens who are affected by it are allowed to express their assessments. This is done 
thanks to an Internet-based information system where all the projects are listed, and 
their characteristics summarized. Also, we assume that only a single dimension  of the 
project (say, “overall quality”) can be assessed by the public. Votes may be assumed to 
range from 0 (very bad) to 5 (excellent)3.  
Column 2 of Table 1 reports the overall assessment received by each project, 
typically computed as the average, or the median, of all the assessments cast by each 
citizen. Here we do not specify the individual assessments, and we simply report their 
hypothetical aggregate. Column 3 indicates the size of the project, expressed, say, in 
thousands of Euros. We assume that projects’ outcomes lose relevance as time goes by, 
                                                 
3  As noted above, in the unabridged formulation of reputation-based governance of public 
works, public administration and firms rate each other, and the overall rating of a firm is a 
weighted average of the valuations that its projects received by both the public and by public 
administrations. Also, assessments of a completed project may be on more than one dimension. 
See Picci 2007a and Picci 2007b. A demonstrator of the Internet-based information system 
supporting a reputation-based governance of public works (available at 
http://fire.ei.unibo.it:8080/rebagware/) is illustrated in Confalonieri et. al., 2007.  
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with a time discount factor equal to 0.8. Column 4 shows the time discounted values of 
projects. The sizes of last year’s projects are multiplied by the time discount factor, 
while this year’s projects are not discounted. 
The reputation of each firm is a weighted average of the assessments received by  
its projects. Doing well on bigger projects, or in more recent ones, influences overall 
reputation more than doing well in small or remote projects. Column 9 shows the 
reputations of the nine firms, computed as: 
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where iR  is the reputational score of firm i, and yearias ,  is the assessment received by the 
project carried out by firm i in a given year. yearipv ,  indicates the present value of the 
same project.  For firm 1, reputation is obtained as: 
(1’)  
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3003
300120
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Reputational scores do not contain information on the relative size of the relative 
importance of firms. So for example, if two firms carried out the same number of 
projects each year, with one firm doing projects twice as big than the other, and both 
firms have received exactly the same assessments, they would have the same 
reputational score. An example is provided by the outcomes of firm n. 1 and of firm n. 7 
in Table 1. The two firms received the same assessments each year, and they have the 
same reputation (equal to 3.286), even if  the projects of firm n. 7 were twice the size of 
those of firm n. 1. 
The idea of the reputational budget is to develop a metric of the assessments 
where the size of the projects matters. Obviously, there are many ways to make this idea 
operational. To narrow down the field of possible candidates, we establish that the 
reputational budget should have the following characteristics. 
a) Every year, all firms are allocated a certain number of reputational points, 
some positive, some negative, so that the sum of the reputational points 
allocated equals zero. 
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b) The reputational points that are allocated depend linearly on the size of the 
projects, so that, coeteris paribus, if a project is twice as big as another 
project, it commands twice as many reputational points. 
c) The reputational budget of a firm is equal to the sum of the time discounted 
reputational points it has received over time. The sum of the reputational 
budgets of all firms is zero. 
 
Columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1 show the computation of reputational points satisfying 
the properties listed above4. Column 5 computes a set of weights, expressing the 
assessments while considering the size of the related projected. For each firm, these are 
equal to the overall assessment times the share of the firm’s project within the sum of 
the projects carried out by all firms in a given year:  
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yeariw ,  is the weight of firm i in a given year. It is equal to the assessment, yearias , , times 
the relative share of the present value of that firm’s project in a given year, within the 
overall present value of all projects carried out in that year. In the summation symbol at 
the denominator of the fraction, k is the number of firms (and of projects executed in a 
given year), 9 in our example.  
To clarify further, consider that for firm 1, in year 2006, such weighted assessment 
equals:  
(2’)   
3120
1204154.0 ⋅=  
 
                                                 
4  A note on terminology. Reputation, reputation index, and reputation score are 
synonymes. Reputational points, on the other hand, are the units that form a reputational budget. 
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Column 6 shows the demeaned assessments. They are equal to the assessments 
minus the average weighted assessments, which is simply the sum of the weights of 
Column 5: 
(3)   ∑
=
−=
k
i
iyeariyeari wasasdem
1
,,  
For firm 1 in 2006, the value is: 
(3’)   292.24708.1 −=  
Column 7, finally, computes the reputational points, equal to the demeaned 
assessments of Column 6 times the present value of the project carried out in a given 
year: 
 
(4)   yeariyeariyeari pvasdemRP ,,, *=  
 
For firm 1 in 2006, the value is obtained as: 
(4’)   120*708.1923.204 =  
Column 10 shows the reputational budget for each firm, simply obtained as the 
sum over the two years of the time discounted reputational points: 
 
(5)   2007,2006, iii RPRPRB +=  
 
For firm 1, the reputational budget is equal to: 
(5’)   304.91923.20462.113 −=  
Note that the sum in fact, as required by condition c) above, time discounts the 
reputation points of past years, since they are computed using the present value of 
projects – see equation (4). Also, the sum across firms of the reputational budgets is 
equal to zero, and the reputational points in a given year sum to zero (see the bottom of 
column 10 and, for each year, the bottom of column 7). Moreover, note that such 
computations satisfy property b) above, as again it is made clear by a comparison of 
firm 1 and 7: The two firms receive the same assessment in each year, and the latter 
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carried out projects that are exactly twice as big as the former. As already noted, their 
reputation is identical, but the reputational budget of firm n. 7 is twice that of firm n. 1 
(227.237 reputational points vs. 113.619). 
 Reallocating reputational points (for example, through trading – more on the 
issue below) immediately allows for a recomputation of reputation. In particular, it can 
be easily shown that if at the end of each year all firms sell their reputational points (or 
buy them if they own a negative quantity of them), the following happens. First, 
demand for reputational points equals supply, since the reputational points given out 
every year sum to zero by construction. Second, at the end of this exchange, every firm 
will have a reputation that equals the weighted average of individual reputations5. 
 
3. Uses of the reputational budget 
 
Within an application of Reputation-based Governance to the management of public 
works, the reputational budget could be used in two broad ways. First, the public 
administration may consider the reputational budget within the source selection process. 
Second, firms may trade reputational points. We consider these two possibilities in turn. 
 Using reputation considerations within public procurement is not a novelty. In 
the United States, in the 1990s a reform in public procurement effectively forced public 
officials to consider the reputation of the bidder in source selection, together with price 
and perceived quality of the proposal (Kelman, 2002). There, the reputation of the firms 
is assessed by the source selection official, after consulting a database where public 
administrators routinely record their assessments of the performances of the firms they 
interact with, and eventually other sources. 
The present context is different in many respects. First, within Reputation-based 
Governance, assessing the outcome of projects is not the precinct of bureaucrats, but it 
includes the citizenry. A further important difference, with respect to current practices 
in the United States, could follow from the adoption of the reputational budget. In the 
                                                 
5        See the bottom of column 5 in Table 1. Strictly speaking, this  property holds exactly only 
when there is a firm whose reputation is equal to such a weighted average - a firm with exactly 
zero reputational points. This will be true with a continuum of firms. 
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context of a reputation-based governance, the public administration could accept tender 
proposals by firms whose reputation, or reputational budget, is above a certain 
threshold.  
There is an important difference between fixing a threshold in terms of the 
reputation and doing it in terms of the reputational budget. As noted above, the 
reputational score (i.e., reputation) does not depend on the relative importance of the 
firm, while the reputational budget does. In fact, the reputational budget conveys 
information on how good, or bad, a given firm was, and on the size of the projects it 
carried out. So for example, defining a cut-off point in order to be admitted in the 
bidding process that equals the first percentile of the reputational budgets of all firms6, 
would in fact select firms that typically are of size above average – or that are of 
medium size, but that performed very well in the past.  
 Such a rule would make sense when the size or complexity of projects suggests 
not to give the job to a small firm. In those cases, the administration may desire to deal 
with a big firm that has done at least reasonably well in the past, but at the same time 
may be willing to give smaller firms a chance, provided that they have shown to be  
exceptional performers. Using the reputational budget to define a cut-off point, in other 
words, would incorporate in the considerations of the public administration the presence 
of a trade-off between the reputation and the size of the firm. On the other hand, if the 
size of the project is small, the public administration may desire to define a cut-off rule 
for presenting a bid that is a function of the reputation, instead than of the reputational 
budget, expressing in this way its indifference with respect to the size of the bidding 
firms. 
 Of more interest is the case where we admit the possibility that firms trade 
reputational points. In order to discuss the implications of such a possibility, it is useful 
first to consider some previous contributions. Holmström (1982) studies the lifetime 
evolution of career concerns, to conclude that these may be too strong at the early stages 
af a career, and too weak as retirement age approaches. The intuition behind his result 
                                                 
6  Note that the average of the reputational budgets is zero by construction. The median, as 
opposed to the mean (or sum), of the reputational budgets may be positive or negative, 
depending on the distribution of the assessments. 
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may be seen in a simple moral hazard repeated game. As the end date of the game 
approaches, the future expected stream of payoffs tends to vanish, and “cheating” today 
becomes a more advantageous prospect compared to the early stages of the game (see 
Kreps et al., 1980).  
In this context, trading reputation may be of help in setting the incentives 
straight. Fama (1980) already noted that managers may be disciplined by the fact that 
their reputation today positively influences the expected pay that they may secure by 
moving to another firm – a situation where the “trading of reputation” is in fact taken 
care of by the presence of a market for managerial labor. 
A possibility for trading reputation is by trading brand names. To analyze how 
such a possibility affects life-cycle incentives (of firms’ owners) to exert effort – again, 
in the spirit of Holmström – Tadelis (2002) considers a model both of moral hazard and 
of adverse selection, to conclude that such trading of brand names provides the sought-
for incentives to build a good reputation – i.e., past good behaviours are rewarded – and 
that it alleviates the moral hazard problem even with short-lived agents.  
However, Tadelis’ results, as he himself clearly states, are conditional on the 
assumption that clients do not observe such trading in reputation (brand names). 
Otherwise, since the model is also one of adverse selection, clients would take the 
buying of somone else’s reputation as a sign of bad quality. We witness here one of 
those cases where the availability of more information leads to worse overall outcomes, 
as in Hirshleifer (1971), and as discussed more generally in Bassan et al. (2003). Tadelis 
concludes that, for example, secrecy “is not reasonable in all industries (e.g., medical 
practices)” – which, for the particular case cited, comes as sobering news for the reader. 
According to Tadelis, the “model of the paper [...] seems to fit small owner-operated 
firms with transient clients, such as restaurants and small service businesses, but is 
harder to link to larger firms.” Note also that the market for reputation illustrated by 
Tadelis is in fact “only” a market for brand names. Sales of brand names are perforce 
rare, and the ensuing lack of thickness of the market does not bode well for its efficient 
functioning.  
In this respect, the computation of a reputational budget would innovate in 
several ways. First, reputational points could be traded at any time, allowing for the 
presence of a well functioning market, not limited to rare purchases of someone else’s 
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brand name. Second, a market for reputational points could more easily guarantee the 
secrecy that is necessary in Tadelis’ treatment, given that the very visible brand names 
not only would not change hands, but also that they may even eventually become 
irrelevant. 
 Different institutional solutions may be devised in order for reputation points to 
be exchanged and for reputational budgets to be balanced. For example, firms could be 
required to balance their reputational budget by the end of each year, so as to carry over 
to the next year zero reputational points. For this purpose, a market could function, say, 
for a period of time at the end of each year, where firms could trade reputational points. 
Just as market forces impose balancing a budget, so an appropriate institutional set-up 
could impose firms to start a new year with non-negative reputational points (which is 
just the same as asking all firms to equalize their reputations by trading reputational 
points). In public procurement, such a result could be obtained by adopting a rule 
establishing that public administrations can only admit tender proposals from firms 
whose reputation is not below average. In this way, firms interested in public contracts 
and having a negative reputational budget would have a compelling incentive to buy 
reputational points, and firms with a positive reputational budget would increase their 
profits by selling theirs. 
 Such a market for reputation would also present firms with interesting 
opportunities for arbitrage. Assume for example that firms differ in technology in the 
following way. Some firms have a comparative advantage in producing at low cost, but 
are relatively inefficient when it comes to providing  high quality products or services. 
Other firms are the opposite. Trading reputational points would then allow firms to 
exploit their comparative advantages. Firms of the first type would find it convenient to 
focus on what thay can do well – produce cheaply – expecting that they will obtain  
below average assessments, but knowing that they will be able to buy the needed 
reputational points on the market. Firms with a comparative advantage in quality would 
also focus on what thay can do well, i.e., acquiring reputational points that they would 
later sell to the low-cost firms7.  
                                                 
7  If, as in Tadelis (2002), trading in reputation remains secret, public administrations 
would not separate the type of the firm that they face – low cost, or high quality. Such a lack of 
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Last, the presence of a market for reputation in fact allows the public 
administration not to directly consider reputation in source selection, thus requiring less 
of an institutional change. At the closing of the market, all firms would have the same 
reputation (and zero reputational points). Good performances are prized because they 
command reputational points that can later be sold. The role of reputation in source 
selection would in fact be present, but it would be mediated by the presence of a market 
for reputation. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
I have illustrated the concept of the reputational budget considering a typical public 
procurement problem. Reputational budgeting, just as the framework of reputation-
based governance into which it is embedded, has a more general applicability. For 
example, reputational points could be traded by bureucrats who are forced to balance 
their reputational budgets at the end of each year, using part of their salary. True, in 
such a context an unconstrained market for reputational points could be seen as running 
the risk of reverting the public administration to a pre-Weberian and patrimonial model 
of bureaucracy: In order to recoup the moneys spent for the reputational points needed 
to remain viable as a public official, some bureaucrats would provide strong incentives 
for rent seeking activities, or for plain corruption. A more modest solution could 
however be obtained simply by making a fixed part of the bureucrat’s salary conditional 
on the reputational points acquired every year. 
 Reputational budgeting could also be used within the private sector. However, 
the framework of Reputation-based Governance puts a strong emphasys on the 
democratic accountability of public policies. The quantification of the reputational 
budget derives from the assessments of policies as carried out by the citizens (and also  
by other actors of governance). Within Reputation-based Governance, the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                               
separation has in itself a cost, because there are projects for which one type of firm could be 
preferred to the other. For example, in a case where quality correlates positively with the ability 
to carry out complex projects, it would be beneficial to the administration facing one such 
project to choose a high quality firm. 
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such a systematic assessment, and its relevance in the ensuing allocation of resources 
(and of power), plays the important role of providing a channel for the legitimizaton of 
policies that runs parallel to their traditional legitimization through democratic 
elections. Such a dimension of the problem is inevitably lost when the concept of the 
reputational budget is applied to the private sphere. True, recent emphasys on the social 
accountability of private actors may suggest a wider applicability of the concept of 
Reputation-based Governance, and of the instrument of the reputational budget. 
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Table 1. Reputation scores and the reputational budget 
 
Columns: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Year 2006         
Firm i yearias ,  Value.proj yearipv ,  yeariw ,  yeariasdem , yeariRP,     
1 4 150 120 0.154 1.708 204.923    
2 3 800 640 0.615 0.708 452.923    
3 2 350 280 0.179 -0.292 -81.846    
4 0 50 40 0.000 -2.292 -91.692    
5 2 1100 880 0.564 -0.292 -257.231    
6 1 945 756 0.242 -1.292 -976.985    
7 4 300 240 0.308 1.708 409.846    
8 4 130 104 0.133 1.708 177.600    
9 5 75 60 0.096 2.708 162.462    
 Avg=2.78 Σ=3900 Σ=3120 Σ=2.292  Σ=0    
          
Year 2007         
Firm i yearias ,  Value.proj yearipv ,  yeariw ,  yeariasdem , yeariRP,  
value 
works iR  iRB  
1 3 300 300 0.196 -0.304 -91.304 420 3.286 113.619 
2 1 700 700 0.152 -2.304 -1613.043 1340 1.955 -1160.120 
3 4 550 550 0.478 0.696 382.609 830 3.325 300.763 
4 2 40 40 0.017 -1.304 -52.174 80 1.000 -143.866 
5 4 950 950 0.826 0.696 660.870 1830 3.038 403.639 
6 4 1300 1300 1.130 0.696 904.348 2056 2.897 -72.637 
7 3 600 600 0.391 -0.304 -182.609 840 3.286 227.237 
8 4 100 100 0.087 0.696 69.565 204 4.000 247.165 
9 2 60 60 0.026 -1.304 -78.261 120 3.500 84.201 
 Avg=3 Σ=4600 Σ=4600 Σ=3.304  Σ=0 Σ=7720  Σ=0 
 
Note: 
The time discount factor equals 0.8 
 
